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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes whether a capitation-based resource allocation system will provide the
incentives necessary to pursue or provide quality, cost-effective care within the Military Medical
Department. To answer this question, capitation budgeting and its salient characteristics were
defined. Then, the risks and incentives associated with capitation budgeting were compared against
other budgetary methods. Subsequently, the civilian sector's experience with prepaid, managed care
plans was analyzed, focusing on the incentives to the various health care players. It also questioned
whether the quality of care has been effected. Next, the study drew on civilian sector experience to
evaluate the potential impact of incentives on various players in the Military Health Services System.
The study concludes, that a capitation-based resource allocation system will provide the various players
in the military health care arena with the proper incentives to provide quality, cost-effective care.
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The Department of Defense (DoD) Medical Health Services
System's (MHSS) mission is to provide and promote quality
health care services for military personnel, their families
and other beneficiaries during peace and war (U.S. DoD
0ASD(HA), April 1993). As the nation's largest employer,
and one of the largest health care providers in the world,
the military is facing unprecedented challenges in managing
steadily rising health care costs. These challenges are
consistent with those confronting the civilian health care
community (U.S. CBO, May 1993). The reasons for increasing
health care costs include high-priced medical technology,
proliferation of facilities and services, increased labor
costs, reduced beneficiary cost-sharing, changes in medical
practice/standards, and normal inflation (U.S. DoD QASD(HA),
April 1993). However, it is important to recognize that the
current budgeting and allocation system plays a significant
role in the observed inflationary trend.
Military health care providers have few incentives to
curb the delivery of unnecessary and inappropriate health
care. In the direct health care system, DoD has
historically provided each medical treatment facility (MTF)
1
commander with a budget based on the quantity of care
delivered and the ½evel of resources used at the military
treatment faci±ity (U.S. CBO, May 1993, p. 13).' To
increase the facility's budgeted demand, the medical MTF
corr ander only has to deliver more care and use more
resources. This budgeting and allocation methodology may
provide significant disincentives for efficient resource
use. For example, MTF commanders are rewarded with larger
budgets for producing more workload without always being
held accountable for the necessity of the workload
generated. To encourage economical behavior, health care
providers must be motivated to prescribe economically.
A perceived solution to combat these problems is to
revamp the health care system. Incentives should motivate
consumers and suppliers to pursue and provide cust-effective
care (U.S. DoD OASD(HA), April 1993). The goal is a system
that delivers value by giving people access to high quality,
efficient health care. A population-based financial
resource allocation methodology, or capitation budgeting,
has been proposed to accomplish this (U.S. DoD OASD(HA),
March 1993, p. 1). The fundamental purpose for implementing
'The direct health care system is made up of hospitals and
clinics operated by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It includes 140
hospitals and 553 clinics worldwide and employs more than 54,000
civilian, as well as 146,000 active-duty military personnel.
Almost all of the care that beneficiaries receive through the
direct care system is supplied by military physicians working at
the Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs). (U.S. CBO, 1993, p. 3)
2
a capitated model is to create the proper incentives for
using scarce resources efficiently. Transferring financial
risk from DoD and the military departments to the local
catchment area is expected to create this incentive. In an
appropriately structured capitated system, commanders
benefit from savings realized from increased productivity.
This should give them an incentive to optimize performance.
Capitation rates are also prospectively determined, which
should make budget development and execution more
predictable and objective.
Under a capitation-based resource allocation system, the
commander of each MTF assumes responsibility for providing a
defined range of necessary health services to a defined
population, for a fixed amount per beneficiary, regardless
of the services used (U.S. CBO, 1988, p. 56). Presumably,
there is no financial incentive under this approach to
increase the number of services or to provide more costly
care than is clinically appropriate. Capitation is designed
to discourage inappropriate admissions, unnecessarily long
lengths of stay and unwarranted services.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research encompasses a comprehensive analysis of
whether a capitation-based resource allocation system will
provide the incentives necessary to pursue or provide
quality, cost-effective care within the military medical
3
department. 2 To answer this primary question, four
subsidiary research questions will be addressed:
(1) What incentives exist for the local commanding
officer under a capitation-based resource
allocation system?
(2) Does a capitation-based resource allocation system
provide military physicians with the incentives to
provide cost-effective care?
(3) What are the incentives for the beneficiaries of
the MHSS under a capitation-based resource
allocation system?
(4) Will the quality of care erode under a capitation-
based resource allocation system in the MHSS (will
the incentive exist for health care providers to
withhold necessary health care services)?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS
The focus of the analysis was to determine if a
capitation-based resource allocation system within the MHSS
would provide the necessary incentives to provide quality,
cost-effective care. Base year per capita cost computations
will not be analyzed here, neither will the procedures for
implementing capitation budgeting within the MHSS. Also,
the analysis will be limited to the private sector
capitation meth, .- logy because policies are evolving within
the DoD. Details of the DoD policy and the proposed DoD
capitation model are being developed by the Office of
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (OASD(HA)).
21n this study, quality of care under capitation budgeting
will be compared to quality of care under fee-for-service.
4
The analysis will concentrate on health care services
analogous to civilian health care, and will exclude military
unique functions.
Appendix A contains the current FY94 capitation
methodology for the military departments developed by the
OASD(HA).
D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
The research effort was not based on results of previous
studies or ongoing studies. However, previous studies have
been conducted on a capitation-based resource allocation
system within the military medical departments. Capitation
budgeting is also currently being introduced into the MHSS;
a form of capitation budgeting will be introduced in FY
1994.
Data was gathered primarily through telephone
communication with key individuals at the Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery (BUMED), and by reviewing available literature,
reports, memorandums, testimonies and other official
correspondence on capitation budgeting.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
Capitation budgeting is a method for paying a provider a
fixed price per person served for a defined range of
services and a specified time period (Aiken, 1989, p. 6).
One essential element of capitation budgeting is that a
5
defined population must exist. Currently, a clearly defined
beneficiary population through closed enrollment is not an
element of the Military Health Services System. An MHSS
enrollment system is currently being discussed, in
conjunction with implementing capitation budgeting. This
analysis acknowledges that an enrollment system is an





Chapter II will summarize current literature with the
emphasis on the definition and salient characteristics of
capitation budgeting. Also, the risks and incentives
associated with capitation budgeting will be compared to
other budgetary and payment methods. Finally, the advantages
and disadvantages of capitation budgeting will be addressed.
These findings will be used as a foundation for the
remaining chapters.
Chapter III will outline managed health care in the
private sector. This chapter will also address the
incentives provided by capitation budgeting among the
various players in the private sector: hospitals,
physicians, and patients. The concerns and impact of
6
quality of care under a capitation budgeting methodology in
the private sector will also be examined.
Chapter IV will compare and contrast the civilian sector
capitation budgeting experience and its incentives to the
MHSS (as it currently operates). This analysis will provide
the basis to conclude if the incentives provided under
capitation budgeting in the civilian sector will carry over
to the MHSS.
Chapter V summarizes the results of the analysis.
Additionally, the chapter provides recommendations regarding
the findings and conclusions.
7
II. CAPITATION BUDGETING CONCEPT
This chapter defines capitation budgeting and its
salient characteristics. It also compares the risks and
incentives associated with capitation budgeting against
other budgetary methods. Finally, the advantages,
disadvantages, and potential problems of a capitation-based
resource allocation system will be addressed. This
depiction of capitation budgeting will be the foundation for
discussing capitation in both the civilian sector and the
MHSS.
A. DEFINITION
A capitation-based resource allocation system is
increasingly advocated as a budgeting strategy to
consolidate resources, develop services, focus
responsibility, and manage care appropriately. Basically,
capitation budgeting can be defined as a prospective
reimbursement process where the provider is paid a fixed
price per person served for a defined range of services and
a specified time period (Aiken, 1989, p. 6). Under this
definition, capitation has three crucial elements: (1) care
is prepaid with a predetermined, agreed-upon price, and does
not vary according to the value or intensity of services;
8
(2) the payment is tied to specific capitated patients,
typically through some type of an enrollment system; and (3)
the provider bears full financial risk if expenditures
exceed payments. Combined, these elements give the provider
a strong incentive to manage care wisely. Alternatively,
the provider keeps part, if not all of the savings when the
medical costs are within the capitated payment. (Schroer,
1987, p. 128)
Capitation budgeting fundamentally governs the users'
payment to the organization providing health care (Aiken,
1989). It is not required that doctors or other
professional personnel be paid on a per capita basis under
capitation budgeting. Providers could be paid by the
program in a wide variety of ways, including salary and fee-
for-service. Those who finance care are more concerned with
controlling aggregate costs than with the particular mode of
remuneration among providers (Aiken, 1989, p. 8).
B. CHARACTERISTICS
Capitation budgeting is designed to create financial
incentives for health care providers to contain costs, but
it also places them at financial risk. To fully understand
if capitation budgeting will provide the incentives for cost
effective care in the Military Health Services System, the




For the purpose of this study, risk is defined as
the chance of loss, or the possibility that the health
plan's revenues will not be sufficient to cover expenditures
incurred in delivering health care services (Shouldice,
1991, p. 516). Risk also includes the opportunity that the
provider realizes profits by keeping the medical costs below
the capitated payments. Thus, risk creates a financial
stake for the health care provider in the health plan's
operation because their compensation is based, to some
degree, on their ability to hold services to an appropriate
level and to economize on more expensive services
(Shouldice, 1991, p. 213).
According to Barry Volin, director of Health Care
Plus and Assistance Vice President for Managed Care Services
at Lutheran Medical Center, "in a capitated ... model, you
don't get paid to provide care, you get paid to assume the
risk to provide care" (Volpp, 1993, p. 1712). Having the
provider assume the financial risk in health ca e services
is different from traditional fee-for-service. It must be
examined to fully understand its consequences.
2. Incentive
In this discussion, incentive is defined as the
means to motivate efficient hospital/health care management.
Incentives also encourage physicians to decrease hospital
10
utilization, resource judiciously, and emphasize preventive
health services (Shouldice, 1991, p. 100).
Because hospitals typically assume full risk under a
capitation-based resource allocation system, the prospective
payment system (PPS) is expected to eliminate the incentive
to perform unnecessary services. The incentives under
capitation budgeting are sharply different from other
traditional payment mechanisms (i.e. fee-for-service and per
diem payment). The incentives inherent under this PPS will
be contrasted to the other financing methods to better
understand the ramifications of capitated budgets.
C. PROVIDERS OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES
1. Hospitals
When a hospital receives a capitated payment, it
receives a fixed amount per patient for an all-inclusive
level of care for a given population - whether or not that
population seeks care. This means that the capitated
provider takes on the full risk of providing health care to
that patient population. 3 Risk sharing attracts wide
support from health care consumers because it signals
accountability for the cost of health care. However, in
order for the health care provider to assume this financial
3Full risk includes both the medical risk of providing health
and full financial risk.
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risk, there must be economic incentives inherent in this
budgetary method.
There are a wide variety of provider payment options
and the risk and incentives associated with each varies.
This spectrum ranges from no economic risk and the incentive
to over-utilize care (fee-for-service), to full economic
risk and the incentive to minimize services (capitation
budgeting). A common payment mechanism that falls in the
middle of the spectrum is per diem payment. These payment
mechanisms and their associated risk and incentives will be
discussed to indicate the significance of assuming full
economic risk with a capitation-based resource allocation
system.
a. Fee-For-Service
From the perspective of the health care provider,
fee-for-service is the preferred reimbursement method
because it is the least risky (Barger, 1985, p. 89). Under
fee-for-service billing, the hospital is reimbursed for each
service rendered. The provider assumes no risk in this
model (other than the typical risk inherent in any business
enterprise such as bad debt expense). The provider's cash
inflow is directly proportional to the services rendered to
patients (Sulmasy, 1992, p. 924).
Fee-for-service health care financing also
encourages spending rather than conserving. Health care
12
decision makers have little or no incentive for cost
control. In open-ended fee-for-service systems, economic
rewards are predicated on huw much one does, whether or not
more is appropriate. The rewards are immediate and tangible
(Enthoven, 1991, p. 2532). This budgetary system is very
inflationary because of all the incentives to provide
inappropriate or unnecessary care (Eastaugh, 1992, pp. 240,
241).
Some of the added volume and intensity of care
might represent real health benefits to patients, but there
is no incentive to ensure that the benefits' value exceed
the cost (Eastaugh, 1992, pp. 84-92).
b. Payment Per Diem
Per diem payment is an all-inclusive rate for
each day of care. This payment method shifts some of the
financial risk from the purchaser to the health care
provider (i.e., the hospital). As risk shifts to the
hospital, it stimulates cost consciousness, and unlike
billed charges, offers incentives for efficient daily
hospital performance (Barger, 1985, pp. 89, 90). However,
the hospital's risk is restricted because it is not
financially penalized for excessive lengths of stay and
13
changes in admission (Barger, 1985, p. 90).4 Hence, the
hospital has only a limited incentive for cost control. The
longer a health care provider keeps a patient in the
hospital, the larger their income.
However, the hospital could be subject to full
risk for ancillary services and changes in case mix
(Schroer, 1987, pp. 128-130). The acceptance of this full
risk creates the potential for an economic reward if the
hospital can control the use of ancillary services for each
day of a patient's stay. A common approach to partially
avoid the risk associated with changes in case mix is to
negotiate individual per diem rates for major service areas,
such as intensive care, surgical cases, etc. (Lewin, 1987,
p. 47)
c. Capitation Budgeting
As mentioned previously, hospitals, as health
care providers, receive a single advance payment for all
covered services for each beneficiary for a specified period
under a capitated approach. In contrast to fee-for-service
payment, capitation encourages providers to control outlays,
including both price and volume intensity (Kay, 1990, p.
4This assumes a pure per diem payment scenario where the
hospital receives a flat rate for each day of care. This is not
based on per case reimbursement and diagnosis related groups (DRGs)
where there is a predetermined price for the "package of hospital
care." With per case reimbursement and DRGs, the incentive would
be to decrease the length of stay, in order to increase financial
renumeration.
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142). Capitation offers no incentive to provide more health
care services than necessary. It offers the long run
incentive to provide preventive care, saving money in future
years. This is because the hospital assumes full economic
risk and accepts responsibility for providing all the
required health care services for a defined population for a
prospective, negotiated payment.
In theory, capitation also breaks the tie between
payment and the specific service provided. The health care
provider has the opportunity to assess the need for services
and make decisions based on professional and clinical
judgement, free from traditional monetary considerations
(Aiken, 1989, p. 14). However, capitation budgeting puts
the hospital at substantial financial risk for exceeding per
capita payments. This puts the patients' and health care
providers' interests at odds creating forceful incentives to
underservice (Aiken, 1989). Each dollar spent on health
care is a dollar drawn away from the health care provider's
income.
2. Physicians
The reimbursement mechanisms employed for health
care have traditionally placed the hospital at financial
risk. For the most part, physicians have escaped this
burden. They do not normally participate in any risk
sharing arrangements. Many physicians are still reimbursed
15
under the conventional fee-for-service or salary systems.
Both are basically risk free for the doctor. (Rosenstein,
1991, pp. 315, 316)
Under a fee-for-service arrangement, a physician's
income increases with the number of services provided, which
is commonly referred to as the "production" formula. The
physician is essentially shielded from any risk. This
payment mechanism can encourage inefficient use of medical
resources. The financial incentive is to overuse the most
expensive health services (Shouldice, 1991, p. 18).
Four factors contribute to this incentive. First,
as mentioned above, the physician's income increases with
the number of services provided. Second, the physician's
main priority is to deliver high-quality care.
Unfortunately, high-quality care frequently translates into
high-quantity care. The "do more, know more" mind-set is
reinforced throughout the medical school and residency
training period. Third, there is the constant introduction
of new medical technology, which contributes to growing
costs. New technologies reduce the medical risks and
increase the benefits of patient care. If doctors are paid
under fee-for-service, new technologies become common
medical practice without much regard to their cost.
Finally, escalating malpractice concerns encourage doctors
to order extra tests, obtain second opinions and practice
other measures of defensive medicine. Fee-for-service
16
payment encourages doctors to practice defensive medicine.
(Rosenstein, 1991, pp. 321-331)
The risk to a salaried physician is also limited.
In salary systems, neither the physician's income nor the
budget available for patient care depend upon the level of
per capita patient care (Sulmasy, 1992, p. 326). However,
production may be low for a salaried physician because the
physician's income is not contingent on productivity. The
salaried physician may also over-use costly technology
simply because it requires less effort (Sulmasy, 1992, p.
324).
The ability to reduce health care costs is
determined in part by the physician payment mechanism. Cost
may remain excessive for a hospital financed with a full
risk capitated budget if the physicians work under a no risk
fee-for-service arrangement. Physicians have the incentive
to inflate the chargeable services even if it harms the
hospital's financial status (Eastaugh, 1992). Unless
physicians accept some risk sharing, cost effectiveness may
not be improved.
3. Suimary
The following tables summarize the risk and economic
incentives intrinsic in the payment mechanisms discussed for
health care providers, both the hospitals and physicians, in
17
regards to admissions, length of stay and resources used
under each (Rosenstein, 1991, p. 316).
INCENTIVES FOR HOSPITALS
TABLE I
HoePitals Admissions Length of Resources
Stay Used
Fee-For- + + +
Service no risk no risk no risk
Per Diem + +
limited risk limited risk full risk
Capitation
full risk full risk full risk
+ = incentive to increase
- = incentive to decrease
Fee-for-service payment has no economic risk and
encourages health care providers to increase admissions,
length of stay, and the amount of resources used. In
contrast, full risk capitation-based budgets encourage
providers to decrease the number of admissions, the length
of stay and the resources used. Pure per diem payment falls
in between the two extremes. It has limited risk for
admissions and length of stay, and full risk for the
ancillary resources used. This encourages providers to





physicians Admissions Length of Resources
__ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ Stay Used
Fee-for- + + +
service no risk no risk no risk
Salary neutral neutral +
no risk no risk no risk
Capitation
I full risk full risk full risk
+ = incentive to increase
- = incentive to decrease
A physician who receives fee-for-service payment has
the incentive to increase admissions, length of stay and
resources used. Salaried physicians are subject to no risk,
because the physicians' income does not depend on per capita
patient care. In this respect, the physician has neither an
incentive to increase or decrease the number of admissions
and length of stay. However, salaried physicians have the
incentive to increase the number of resources used to the
extent that this requires less effort and has no impact on
them personally. Physicians who are capitated, accept full
risk of providing health care services to patients and have




The obvious advantage of capitation budgeting is cost
control, curbing the escalating dollars spent on health care
in the United States. The PPS creates financial incentives
for health care providers to contain costs. Health care
providers increase their profits by practicing cost-
effective medicine and coordinating and eliminating
redundancies in services (Schroer, 1987, pp. 127-129).
Capitation budgeting also creates a predictable cash flow,
eliminates the standard billing process and circumvents
potential lengthy delays in claims payment (Schroer, 1987,
p. 129).
E. PRINCIPAL DISADVANTAGES
The primary disadvantage of a capitation-babed resource
allocation system is that the provider assumes full risk for
the possibility that the treatment required by a capitated
patient will exceed the capitation amount. For some health
care providers, this risk far outweighs the advantages
(Schroer, 1987, p. 129). A capitation system also places
virtually all of the responsibility and rewards for
effective management in the hands of the provider, who may
not want all of the responsibility (Schroer, 1987, p. 129).
20
F. POTENTIAL PROBLEM
Capitation theoretically rewards providers for not
providing services. Under this premise, capitation
budgeting could compel health care providers to become
restrictive gatekeepers. Physicians will continually be
forced into a series of moral stress tests, knowing that the
consequences of doing good for a patient and ensuring
quality care will either reduce their profits or limit the
resources available to other patients. The physician-
patient relationship could be undermined if patients feel
that they cannot trust their physicians to act in their best
interest. (Shouldice, 1991)
Although physicians have the incentive to withhold
treatment from patients and undermine quality care for
financial gains under capitation budgeting, there are
arguments why this is not plausible. First, physicians as
licensed practitioners are worried about their reputation as
professionals. Also, there is incentive not to sacrifice
quality of care because of the competition for subscribers
among health care organizations in the medical field. The
net balance of these conflicting incentives is currently
being debated.
Capitated managed care plans also instill quality
management programs. These programs are designed to
determine the quality of care baseline and to develop and
maintain programs to keep it at an acceptable level. They
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also institute improvements when the opportunity arises or
the care does not meet standards. (Slee, 1987, p. 120)
G. SUMMARY
It is presumed that capitation budgeting gives health
care providers a strong incentive to provide appropriate
care in a timely and efficient manner, to account for the
cost of care, and to plan cooperatively. For the purpose
of this analysis, captation budgeting will refer to a system
in which (1) care is prepaid with a predetermined price; (2)
the payment is tied to a number of capitated patients; and
(3) the provider is at financial risk for expenditures.
Accordingly, the provider has an incentive to manage care
wisely. Given this foundation, the following section will
discuss the private sector's experience with capitation
budgeting, including the incentives to the various health
care players and their effects on the quality of health
care.
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III. CIVILIAN SECTOR'S EXPERIENCE WITH CAPITATION BUDGETING
Given the characteristics and summary of incentives and
risks in the previous section, this chapter will address the
private sector's experience with capitation budgeting under
managed care. First, managed care will be defined, and the
proliferation of managed care programs and pre-paid group
practices will be discussed. This study will then focus on
the incentives to the various health care players under a
pre-paid managed care program. 5 Finally, the chapter will
address whether a prospective payment system has affected
the quality of health care, as compared to the traditional
fee-for-service payment systems. These findings will answer
the four subsidiary research questions from a civilian
sector perspective. The subsequent chapter will draw on
these findings and address these questions from the
perspective of the MHSS.
A. MANAGED HEALTH CARE
Managed care is one of the fastest growing cost and
provider accessibility control systems in the United States
health care delivery industry (Engoron, 1988, pp. 44-46).
5Unless indicated otherwise, the incentives, outcomes and
findings discussed throughout this thesis pertain to the staff and
group HMO models.
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The rocketing growth of managed care responds to one of the
most difficult problems facing the American people:
controlling their medical expenses. Increased demand for
improved health care and sharply rising costs have made
health care a critical economic issue for health care
consumers and suppliers, employers, private health insurers,
and public agencies (Hailstones, 1991, p. 242).
1. Definition
Managed care is loosely defined as an arrangement in
which a third party directs patient access and health care
utilization (Flores, 1987, pp. 10-13). The American Medical
Association (AMA) defines Managed Care as:
the control of access to and limitation on
physician and patient utilization of services by
public or private payers or their agents through
the use of prior and concurrent review for
approval of or referral to service or site of
service and financial incentives or penalties
(Iglehart, 1992, p. 965).
Accordingly, one can conclude that the basic goal of
managed health care programs is to reduce both the unit
price and volume of health care services provided. While
there is no uniform agreement about what constitutes a
"managed care program," most include the following six
features:
(1) Channeling patients to high-quality, efficient
providers;
(2) Creating reimbursement systems where physicians and
hospitals are accountable for the cost and quality
of medical services;
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(3) Monitoring and analyzing medical practice patterns;
(4) Establishing quality assurance programs;
(5) Designating Primary Care Physicians (PCPs) and
catastrophic case managers; and
(6) Installing rigorous utilization management
components. (Luft, 1980, pp. 1-5)
Managed care programs are identified most often as
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs), or any of a number of hybrids among
these products (Shouldice, 1991, p. 1). Appendix C provides
a brief description of some common managed care
organizations.
2. History
Accelerating health care costs in the late 1960s
and the trend toward high technology medicine were the two
major forces fostering a radical change in financing health
care. In the early 1970s, the Federal Government embraced
the concept of HMOs as its major strategy for creating an
efficient and fair health care delivery system (Wallack,
1991, p. 27). HMOs are direct service plans which accept a
prepaid premium from their subscribers (members) and deliver
services though their professional staff and affiliated
organizations (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 13-16). Since all fees
have been prepaid through a premium, the HMO does not charge
the patients for specific services rendered, although the
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patients may have obligations to pay copayments and/or
deductibles (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 13-16).
Widespread support for HMOs was based on the
belief that it would benefit all three parties in the health
service transaction - providers, payers, and patients. The
patient would face lower out-of-pocket costs, employers
would pay lower health insurance premiums for their
employees, and the providers, by keeping costs down, would
expand their market share or earn surpluses. (Wallack,
1991, p. 28). There are three principles and practices
followed by this alternative delivery and financing system
(ADFS). First, patient care is managed (i.e., access and
utilization of specialty, emergent and hospital care is
controlled); second, there is a selected group of providers;
and finally, the providers are subject to some financial
risk because revenues are determined by a prepaid premium
(Wallack, 1991, pp. 27-31).
Managed care, in the form of HMOs, began its most
active growth period after Congress passed Title XIII of the
Public Health Service Act, better known as the 1973 HMO Act.
This act allowed managed medical care plans to proliferate
by expanding enrollment to governmentally financed health
care programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid. (Kongstvedt,
1989, pp. 3-5). Before 1970, there were fewer than 50 HMO-
like organizations, with an enrollment of less than 2
percent of the health insurance market (Shouldice, 1991, p.
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29). After reaching a high of 653 in 1988, the number of
HMOs has since declined as a result of mergers,
consolidations, and terminations (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 29-
31).
3. Medicare
With the enormous growth of the HMO industry, the
Federal Government expanded its risk-based reimbursement
approach as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Respcns-bility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA). TEFRA authorized Medicare to pay, on a
prospective rate-setting basis, those organizations that
have a cost-based or risk-based contract with the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA). (Shouldice, 1991, pp.
49-53). The legislation widened the scope of health service
organizations (HSOs) that were eligible to contract with
Medicare to include both federally qualified HMOs and
competitive medical plans (CMPs) (Shouldice, 1991, p. 52).
The HSO, in return for a fixed monthly fee per Medicare
enrollee, accepts the risk for providing all Medicare
services. HMOs and CMPs under contract to the HCFA are
reimbursed according to an adjusted average per capita cost
(AAPCC).6
6AAPCC is Medicare's managed care payment system. Payment is
set at 95 percent of the amount estimated by the Health Care
Financing Administration that similar care would have cost in a
fee-for-service setting. (Shouldice, 1991, p. 505)
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B. INCENTIVES FOR THE PROVIDER OF HEALTH CARE
1. Hospital
The hospital sector's incentive structure has been
revolutionized by the prospective payment system (PPS).
According to Eastaugh (1992), before the PPS was enacted,
rational managers emphasized revenue enhancement,
maximization of reimbursements, and often, negative
productivity shifts. In the future, cost reduction through
productivity improvements will prevail, not old-style growth
and revenue maximization. A production of unnecessary
services is inefficient, and the institution will not be
compensated for them under PPS. (Eastaugh(a), 1992, pp.
313, 314)
a. Delivery Incentives
A major goal of the hospital prospective
payment system is to change the delivery incentives to
encourage prevention and prudent, coordinated, cost-
effective care (Hailstones, 1991, pp. 224, 242, 243).
Hospitals, as health care providers, can accomplish this
goal by (1) introducing a gatekeeper to prevent unnecessary
care and (2) stressing preventive care so conditions can be
treated sooner (prior to the need for hospitalization).
(1) Gatekeeper. Health care providers have
obvious incentives under a capitated-based resource
allocation system to curtail hospital utilization and
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specialist referral (Eastaugh(a), 1992, p. 85). One way
health care providers can reduce hospital utilization and
specialty referral is to introduce the concept of the
gatekeeper or managing physician. Under this scheme, the
patient has unlimited access to the primary care physician
(gatekeeper) but must obtain a referral from that physician
in order to receive health services from specialists, whose
fees are generally higher (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 114, 115).
(2) Preventive Care. The health care
provider is paid the same monthly fee for each member of the
HMO regardless of the costs of caring for that member. This
capitated payment creates strong incentives for HMOs to
provide appropriate care in a timely and efficient manner.
Illnesses that go untreated are more expensive in the long
run. By stressing preventive and outpatient care, HMOs hope
to reduce the economic waste associated with overusing the
emergency room and inpatient hospital services (Kongstvedt,
1989). Decreasing expensive emergency room utilization is a
key factor in cost savings. Members that have prepaid their
medical services are also more likely to seek care in the
early stages of illness (Hailstones, 1991, pp. 242, 243).
This keeps HMO members healthier at reduced costs.
b. Utilization of Care
The private sector's experience with managed
care programs indicates that the incentives for health care
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providers to offer cost effective care have been effective.
Compared to the traditional budgeting method, there are
fewer days of hospital care for a given population under
capitation budgeting.
In the conventional fee-for-service sector,
Americans experience about 960 days of hospital care per
thousand persons; in prepaid group-practice plans, the
comparable figure is 460 days (Starr, 1992, p. 31). The
health care provider's financial risk of exceeding the per
capita fee under capitation budgeting affords an incentive
to provide preventive, efficient medical care. Studies
evaluating the appropriateness of care indicate that as much
as 30 percent of the tests and procedures in the United
States are unnecessary. Taking all sources of inefficiency
into account, roughly one-third of health care expenditures
are unwarranted (Starr, 1992, pp. 30-32).
A capitation-based resource allocation system
creates the incentive to economize on health care services.
This contributes to a decline in unnecessary services,
saving valuable health care dollars.
2. Physician Incentives
Physicians are the key players in a managed care
program. In general, health care payers want to reduce
costs and eliminate wasted nonessential medical care. In
particular, hospitals under capitation are at financial risk
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and want to improve their efficiency in health care
operations. However, the ultimate cost of providing the
care is out of their hands. It is the physicians who have
the ultimate responsibility for providing ongoing quality
medical care (Rosenstein(b), 1991, p. 179). They are the
ones responsible for deciding which tests to order, and what
care to provide. In this respect, physicians must be given
incentives to reduce expenditures. They must be active
participants in the program to reduce health care costs.
a. Physicians as Gatekeepers
Physicians need to be involved as true
resource managers to maintain internal control of the health
care system. Support of this claim is evidenced by the fact
that over 90 percent of HMO's use primary care physicians as
gatekeepers. Their role is to authorize access to
specialty, emergent, and hospital care and to diagnostic
tests (Franks, 1992, p. 424). Patients whose health care is
managed by a gatekeeper are less likely to be hospitalized.
Studies suggest that primary care physicians in HMOs provide
a quality of care that is superior to or at least equal to
that in the fee-for-service settings.
According to P. Franks, M.D., a Rand Health
Insurance Experiment compared patients assigned to a HMO
that used primary care physicians in a gatekeeper role with
patients assigned to a fee-for-service group. The HMO
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patients were hospitalized 40 percent less often than those
in the fee-for-service group. Chart review revealed that
inappropriate surgery was selectively reduced in the HMO
group. Overall, there were few difference in outcomes
between the two groups, although patients assigned to the
HMO have a higher quality of care. (Franks, 1992, p. 425)
Gatekeeping, in regards to managed care, has
come to be a core function of primary patient care. It is
the process of using medical services judiciously,
considering the patients' needs and preferences.
(1) Gatekeepers Payment Methodologies. When
a hospital receives a capitated payment, a critical element
is the provider payment methodology. As mentioned
previously, physician payment configurations range from fee-
for-service payment to capitated payment.
Capitated payments can be limited to
primary care physicians (who act as gatekeepers) or can
include both primary and specialty care (Rahn, 1987). When
capitation exists for primary care services, payment for
referral services and institutional services are made from
capitation funds (Kongstvedt, 1989). The services
themselves may be paid for under a variety of means (fee-
for-service, per diem, and capitation), but the expense is
drawn against a capitated fund or pool.
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When primary care physicians receive a
capitated payment for primary care services, a withhold pool
is commonly developed. A withhold pool sets aside a
predetermined percentage of the primary care capitation
every month, this pool is used to pay for cost overruns in
referral or institutional services (Kongstvedt, 1989). Any
funds remaining in the withhold pool are returned, or shared
among the physicians depending upon the arrangements. This
mitigates some of the risk to the primary care physician.
Their entire capitation payment is not at risk for cost
overruns.
b. Payment Mechanisms
As previously mentioned, the three basic
physician compensation arrangements are fee-for-service,
salary, and capitation. Under a fee-for-service
arrangement, a physician's income increases with the number
of services provided. This creates an incentive to provide
more services. In contrast, when a physician is put at
risk, by accepting a capitated payment, their income
decreases with the number of services provided, creating the
incentive to provide fewer and less costly services.
Salaried physicians are subject to no risk because their
income does not depend upon per capita costs. However, this
creates the incentive to increase the number of resources
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used simply because it requires less effort and has no
impact on them personally.
(1) Acceptance of Financial Risk. A major
factor in determining the overall success of HMOs is whether
physicians accept some financial risk for providing health
care services (Kongstvedt, 1989, pp. 47-55). A study
conducted by John M. Eisenberg looked at physicians who are
individually at risk for deficits in the HMO funds set aside
for referrals. Their patients made 10.5 percent fewer
doctor visits per enrollee. Similarly salaried and
capitated physicians hospitalize their patients less than
those paid by fee-for-service. Thus, the financial
incentives to economize work functioned as anticipated.
Pre-paid capitated plans experience fewer services per
patient. (Eisenberg, 1991, pp. 3113-3115)
(2) Reduced Hospital Expenditures. Thomas
P. Weil compared fee-for-service practices with similar HMO
models. The HMOs have successfully reduced hospital
admissions and overall expenditures. Expenditures for
physicians services were reduced by 30 to 40 percent and
expenditures for hospital services by 10 to 40 percent. To
attain these utilization and cost reductions, physicians
have generally been paid a salary or capitated budget. In
contrast, IPAs or medical care foundations that pay
independent physicians on a fee-for-service basis are not
34
less expensive than pure fee-for-service practices. (Weil,
1991, pp. 533-535). The conclusion is that the traditional
HMOs provide high-quality, lower-cost care than IPAs or fee-
for-service plans.
A 1987 survey also concluded that
salary-based and capitation physician payments in HMOs
reduced the rate o.: hospital days per enrollee as compared
to fee-for-service payments. The average number of hospital
days for HMOs was 365 +/- 92 days per 1000 enrollees.
Salary-based payments reduced the number of hospital days by
47.4, a 13.1 percent reduction. Capitated payment reduced
hospital days by 7.5 percent or 27.3 days, as compared to
fee-for-service. (Hillman, 1989, pp. 86-92)
Capitation most likely reduced the rate
of hospitalization because physicians paid by capitation do
not receive additional revenue from the patients that they
hospitalize. The apparent stronger influence of salary-
based payment (which tends to be used in staff-model HMOs)
on hospital utilization may reflect both the absence of a
financial reward for hospitalizations and other nonfinancial
factors, such as a greater degree of peer review in HMOs
with salary-based payment (Hillman, 1989, pp. 86-92).
c. Physician Response to Incentives
Research findings on fee-for-service
practices are also consistent with the general theory that
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physicians respond to financial incentives. For example,
fee-for-service clinicians who perform their own
radiological services obtain imaging studies 4.0 to 4.5
times more often than physician who refer the work to
radiologists (Eisenberg, 1991, pp. 3113-3115). Another
study demonstrated that when physicians were offered a bonus
for increased services at a fee-for-service ambulatory care
center, they increased laboratory tests by 23 percent
(Eisenberg, 1991, pp. 3113-3115).
Physicians also have the incentive to focus
on alternative revenue generating workload (i.e. Medicare,
Third Party) under capitation budgeting, according to K. L.
Orloff, a previous Chief Financial Officer of a Managed
Health Care Organization. This practice generates more
workload and revenue for the physician, and potentially
restricts the capitated patients access to health care
services.
d. Other Incentives
Besides the financial incentives inherent in
a capitation-based resource allocation system, there are
non-financial incentives that affect the physicians'
behavior in HMOs. These include utilization review,
education, requirements for the prior approval of certain
procedures, and follow-up reports about the prescribing
physician's behavior. Some HMOs actually terminate
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physicians if their prescribing behavior is inconsistent
with the organization's financial goals. (Hillman, 1989, p.
91)
C. PATIENT INCENTIVES
The patients are the ultimate consumers of health care.
Hence, they are the ones that dictate the utilization of
health care services. In order to help control rising
health care costs, the patient must have incentives to use
care economically and face an economic consequence as a
result of their decision.
1. Indemnity Insurance Plans
Under a traditional health care plan, a patient
can seek medical care services from any health care
provider. The insurer is obligated to pay for the costs of
these services within the coverage limits of the patient's
health insurance policy. Patients bear sole responsibility
for identifying their need for care, locating the care
providers, and in most instances, paying for the care.
After care has been received and paid for, the indemnity
carrier-reimburses the patient (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 6-10).
A standard indemnity health insurance plan requires the
patient to cost share, usually in the form of copayments and
deductibles.
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a. Increased Cost Sharing
To help control their medical insurance
costs, employers have shifted to benefit packages that
increase cost sharing by employees (Rahn, 1987, p. 2). A
study conducted by Hewitt Associates reported that the
percentage of employers requiring deductibles on hospital
services rose from 30 percent in 1982 to 63 percent in 1984.
The typical deductible rose from a range of $50 to $100 to a
range of $100 to $200. In 1982, 67 percent of the employers
required no employee copayments after the deductible. By
1984, the figure had dropped to 42 percent. The remaining
58 percent required copayments of 10 to 20 percent. (Rahn,
1987, pp. 2-4)
2.. Managed Care Organizations
The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,
and its 1976 amendment, stimulated the growth of prepaid
managed care systems. Managed care plans offer consumers a
less costly alternative than the traditional fee-for-service
system (Luft, 1980, p. 1).
Managed care plans are designed to control the
finance and delivery of health services (Shouldice, 1991, p.
11). They also provide financial protection against the
burdens of catastrophic illness. This precludes most, if
not all, of the economic uncertainty resulting from large
unanticipated medical expenses. This protection is usually
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not included in standard insurance programs. It is only
acquired at additional expense by purchasing additional
coverage often referred to as "major medical" care.
a. Lower Charges and Premium Growth
As mentioned previously, the PPS gives
managed health care providers an incentive to be cost
conscious. Thus, the premiums plus out-of-pocket expenses
for people enrolled in managed care plans average 10 to 40
percent less than the total patient costs incurred under
traditional insurance. These cost savings are primarily
explained by reductions in costly hospital care (Luft, 1980,
pp. 1-5).
Premium rates also grew more slowly in
managed care plans compared to indemnity plans. In 1991,
the average HMO premium rate rose 7 percent and 8 percent
over 1990 for family and individual coverage, respectively.
On the other hand, premiums for indemnity health insurance
plans rose 19 percent in 1991 for family coverage. (Marion
Merrell-Dow, 1992, p. 5)
b. Health Maintenance Organizations
The consumer incentives are substantial under
HMOs. Since all costs have been prepaid through a premium,
the HMO does not charge patients for specific services
rendered (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 11-13). When care is
required, the HMO directly furnishes services though its
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professional staff and affiliated organizations (Shouldice,
1991, p, 12). This creates limited provider selection
because members are "locked-in" to the HMO system.
Consumers are responsible for medical bills if they use non-
HMO physicians (Barger, 1985, pp. 89-95).
Since all costs have been prepaid, consumers
do not have any financial incentives to limit care in HMOs.
Instead, a primary care physician is established as a
gatekeeper to guide the consumer and ensure they receive the
appropriate amount of health care.
Refer to Appendix C for a further discussion
on health maintenance organizations.
c. Preferred Provider Organizations
Contrasted to HMOs, PPO beneficiaries have
freedom in selecting a health care provider for any covered
service. However, there are substantial economic incentives
to choose only preferred providers (Barger, 1985, pp. 89,
90). The patient may choose any physician included on the
PPO panel, or any available physician in the community, for
each episode of care (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 57-68). No prior
provider selection is necessary (e.g. at enrollment in the
PPO).
This PPO characteristic creates a two-tier
benefits structure; when patients use a designated preferred
provider, their out-of-pocket expenses are reduced. Basic
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coverage is provided for services rendered by non-PPO
providers, but coinsurance and deductibles usually apply.
The patient is fully responsible for any portion of the
provider's bill that exceeds the PPO's maximum allowable
payment. Compared with HMOs, that totally lock-in enrollees
in the HMO system, PPO enrollees have greater flexibility in
choosing physicians. The financial consequence of choosing
an out-of-panel physician is significantly less in a PPO
than in an HMO. The patient pays the entire fee for out-of-
HMO-plan physicians. (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 57-68)
Refer to Appendix C for a further discussion
on preferred provider organizations.
d. Summary
The main incentive for patients under a
managed health care plan can be summed up as lower out-of-
pocket costs. However, to compensate for this reduced
expense, the patient experiences access limitations. The
following table summarizes the patient's cost share and
choice of doctor/hospital under two managed care plans, HMOs
and PPOs (Barger, 1985, pp. 89-95).
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Employee/consumer No; limited Yes; unlimited,
choice of but with penalty
doctors/hospitals if preferred
_provider not used
A patient enrolled in a typical HMO has no
deductible or copayment on any health care received.
However, there is no choice of hospitals or doctors (outside
the plan). A patient enrolled in a PPO is subject to
deductibles and copayments, but has greater flexibility in
the choice of physicians.
3. Studies and Findings
Although there are strong financial incentives for
a patient under a managed care plan to receive care from
providers within the plan, there are some concerns regarding
availability and accessibility of care. A 1986 Rand
Corporation study compared levels of patient satisfaction
7Some employers may cover the entire premium for their
employee.
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with prepaid and fee-for-service medical care (Shouldice,
1991, p. 247). The study determined that the overall
satisfaction level was the same for both the HMO and the
fee-for-service system; but the people assigned to the HMO
were less satisfied overall. With regard to specific
features of the program, those in the fee-for-service system
scored their program higher in length of appointment waits
(shorter); parking arrangements (better); availability of
hospitals (better); and continuity of care (better).
Prepaid consumers were more satisfied with the length of
office waits and cost of care. (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 247,
248)
Another Rand study examined health insurance plans
from 1975 to 1982. The study found that managed care plans
hold the patient responsible for compliance. Under fee-for-
service systems, providers have strong financial interests
to coerce additional follow-up care by telephone and mail.
Thus, fee-for-service plans are more aggressive and
paternalistic. (Eastaugh, 1992, pp. 89, 90)
D. QUALITY OF CARE
As managed care plans and prospective payment systems
have proliferated, concerns over the quality of care have
been expressed. Any mechanism that gives physicians an
incentive to cut unnecessary utilization also gives them an
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incentive to not provide all of the needed health services.
However, quality is very elusive to measure and physicians
have traditionally been reluctant to define it (Schlackman,
1990, p. 1 3 ).8 Avedis Donabedian, who has written seminal
works on quality, suggests that before quality can be
defined in a health care setting, one must first identify
what it is that the health services organization (HSO) wants
to accomplish, its objectives for health care and, more
importantly, what should be achieved. He feels that quality
of care- is therefore defined as "that which has the greatest
likelihood of achieving an organization's objective of care
with the most efficient use of resources." (Donabedian,
1983, pp. 20-23). As mentioned previously, in this thesis,
quality of care in managed care programs will be examined
relative to quality of care under fee-for-service.
1. Evidence
Under PPS, hospitals have near term financial
incentives to minimize health care services and discharge
patients too early. Both of these incentives are absent
under fee-for-service. In fact, fee-for-service encourages
providing more services then is necessary. Concerns over
the quality of HMO service have been brought up by the
government (GAO 1989) and the general public. But HMOs
8Unless otherwise stated, quality refers to clinical quality
of care.
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appear to be performing adequate quality control (Eastaugh,
1992, pp. 84-90).
A Rand health insurance study tracked a control
group and a randomized cohort of enrollees in a managed care
program from 1975 to 1983 (Eastaugh, 1992, np. 84-90). The
study failed to find any evidence that quality of care is
any different in HMOs than in traditional fee-for-service
medicine. Since 1980, several studies have suggested that
HMOs generally have equal or better technical or clinical
quality than the traditional delivery systems (Shouldice,
1991, pp. 194, 243, 244). These conclusions support the
ability of managed care to achieve cost savings while
maintaining quality.
David Mechanic further supports that prospective
payment systems do not have any affect on the quality of
health care. In a 1985 article regarding cost containment
and quality of care, Mechanic reviewed several then
available studies, and concluded that "there is little
overall evidence... that variations in [use and] access of
outpatient care have the significant impacts on health that
some believe them to have." (Mechanic, 1985)
2. Contributing Factors
There are various factors that explain why to
date, there is little evidence that quality care has eroded
under managed health care plans. These inzlude consumer
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actions, current Medicare law&, the 1973 HMO Act, employers'
actions, and actions by health care organization themselves.
a. Pressures From Consumers
One reason that quality hasn't deteriorated
is that the enrollees' actions as health care consumers
create pressures to provide adequate care. Consumer
behavior can take two forms - exit (switching to another
plan when the enrollee is dissatisfied) or voice
(complaining to providers or plan administrators). Each of
these imposes costs on the plan and requires additional
effort by providers. (Aiken, 1989, p. 101)
Also, if the quality of care was perceived by
patients to be consistently poor, the health plan would
cease to exist (Shouldice, 1991, pg. 323). This is a result
of the plan no longer being able to attract enrollment.
Thus, consumers' actions create both financial and
nonfinancial reasons for prepaid systems to ensure they
maintain high-quality services.
b. Medicare Laws
Another factor ensuring quality of care under
prospective payment managed care plans is the current
Medicare law. Under PPS, the Medicare law has two main
provisions that deter abusive practices (U.S. GAO, 1986).
First, in 1988, Congress mandated that professional review
organizations (PROs) assess the quality of care rendered to
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HMO members (Shouldice, 1991, p. 322). The law requires
that PROs monitor hospital care in three areas: (1) the
necessity of hospital admissions, (2) readmissions to
hospitals to determine if premature discharges were
involved, and (3) the quality of care provided by hospitals.
These reviews identify and deter abusive practices relating
to physician incentive plans. The PRO may recommend to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services that a health plan's
contract with HCFA be terminated if there are any problems.
Second, Medicare can exclude participating
physicians and hospitals that are identified as furnishing
inferior quality care (U.S. GAO, 1986). This capability
also deters health care providers from not providing all
necessary health care services. Given the aging population,
Medicare patients potentially make up a substantial part of
a health care practice.
c. Other Factors
(I) Employer's Actions. Another factor that
contributes to quality of care in managed care programs is
that employers seek carriers that can control costs and
monitor quality through well-designed utilization review and
case management programs (Trauner, 1987, p. 86).
Utilization review incorporates three components to
facilitate cost-efficient care: (1) preadmission review;
(2) concurrent review; and (3) retrospective review.
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(2) 1973 HMO Act. The 1973 HMO act also
requires that qualified HMOs monitor utilization and
effectively control medical costs (Rahn, 1987, pp. 56-58).
HMOs must demonstrate controls that will enable it to meet
its stated utilization goals. The procedures may include
preauthorization of services, hospital concurrent and
retrospective review, and a gatekeeper system (Rahn, 1987,
pp. 55-59).
(3) Health Care Organizations. Managed care
organizations may institute additional quality control
devices on their own members to ensure quality is sustained.
This is a result of the business enterprise drive on the
part of the health care organization. The health care
organization must attract enrollees to continue to exist and
operate. These include such programs as formal peer
reviews, health ombudsmen, proper grievance procedures and
physician group contracts (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 313-315).
E. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Managed health care plans and prospective payment
systems were introduced in the private sector in response to
escalating health care costs. In this respect, the
questions of whether or not prospective payment managed care




There is evidence that managed health care plans
do help control costs compared to the typical fee-for-
service indemnity plans. In the period 1988-1991, indemnity
plans experienced an annual cost-inflation of 17.9 percent
on total health care costs, in contrast to 10.1 percent for
staff-model HMOs and 14.4 percent for other HMOs (Eastaugh,
1992, pp. 84-90). Also, an eight year study conducted by
GAO (1989) found that HMOs are more cost-effective than pure
indemnity plans (Eastaugh, 1992, pp. 84-90).
2. Other Findings
Based on the four subsidiary questions addressed,
the introduction of a capitated-based resource allocation
system in the civilian sector does provide incentives for
the delivery of quality, cost effective care. This is
evidenced by the following: (1) lower health care
utilization rates from the reduction of unnecessary
services, (2) decreased hospital and physician expenditures,
(3) lower consumer out-of-pocket health care costs, and (4)
sustained, if not increased quality of care.
F. SUMMARY
Managed care programs in the private sector are
identified most often as Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), or any
hybrid among these products. The widespread support for
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managed care programs, especially HMOs, reflects the belief
that all three parties in health services transactions -
providers, payers, and patients - will benefit, through the
provision of quality, cost-efficient care. This chapter
addressed the private sector's experience with capitation
budgeting under managed care, particularly the incentives to
the various players and quality of care. The conclusion was
that the introduction of a capitation-based resource
allocation system in the civilian sector does provide the
incentives for the delivery of quality, cost-effective care.
The following chapter will address captation budgeting
in the MHSS. The incentives to the various players will be
addressed, based on the private sector's experience. These
findings will be used to answer the question: will
capitation budgeting provide incentives for cost effective
care in the MHSS.
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IV. INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY CAPITATION BUDGETING IN THE MHSS
Prepaid care in civilian sector managed care
organizations can provide some important lessons and
insights for the MHSS. Capitation budgeting in the MHSS
has the same goals as in the private sector, cost effective
care. In this respect, the incentives provided by
introducing capitation budgeting in the MHSS can be examined
by drawing on the civil sector's experience.
This section briefly describes the MHSS and the current
budgeting process. Then, it addresses the incentives under
capitation budgeting for the various players within the
Military Health Services System (CO, physicians,
beneficiaries). Finally, quality of care within the MHSS
will be discussed. These finding will answer the four
subsidiary research questions from a military health care
perspective.
A. MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM
The Military Health Services System provides care to
Department of Defense (DoD) beneficiaries through military
medica- treatment facilities (MTFs) and the Civilian Health
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)
(Executive Summary, p. 18-11). DoD's medical mission is
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twofold (CNO (N931), undated, p. 1). The first major
component is the Readiness Requirement: to maintain
readiness and provide medical support to the armed forces
during military operations. The second component is the
Employment Benefit: to provide medical services and support
members of the armed forces, their dependents, and other
beneficiaries entitled DoD health care.
Dot) provides its beneficiaries health care primarily
through a direct care system of military hospitals and
clinics. Active duty personnel must obtain services through
the direct care system. Other beneficiaries, including
active duty dependents, retirees and their dependents and
survivors, use the direct care system on a space-available
basis. In addition, beneficiaries under age 65 may obtain
care from civilian providers with reimbursement through
CHAMPUS. 9 (Executive Summary, p. 18-11)
The standard CHAMPUS program provides a fixed benefit
to its eligible beneficiaries and places relatively few
restrictions on them. For outpatient care, beneficiaries
may chose freely between the direct care system and civilian
providers. For inpatient care, beneficiaries who reside
within the MTF's catchment area must seek care at the MTF
before CHAMPUS accepts responsibility to pay for the care.
If the MTF is unable to provide the care, the beneficiaries
9Beneficiaries eligible for Medicare (Part A) are not eligible
for CHAMPUS.
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receive a non-availability statement (NAS). This enables
them to seek care from a civilian provider. (Executive
Summary, pp. 18-11, 18-12)
Under the direct care system, beneficiaries receive
free outpatient care and pay a nominal rate for inpatient
care. Active-duty service members and retired officers pay
only $4.75 a day. Active-duty dependents and dependents of
retirees pay a slightly higher daily fee of $9.30. In
contrast, beneficiaries using standard CHAMPUS face cost
sharing provisions, including deductibles and copayments,
similar to those found in private health insurance indemnity
plans. The beneficiaries' cost share depends on their
sponsor's status (active duty or retired), type of care
(inpatient or outpatient), and whether the provider is a
participating provider. (Executive Summary, p. 18-12)
For outpatient care, all standard CHAMPUS users face
both a deductible and copayments. Individuals currently pay
a $150 deductible and families pay a $300 annual deductible.
After meeting the deductible, active duty dependents pay 20
percent of the CHAMPUS allowable charge and all others pay
25 percent. No deductibles apply for inpatient care, and
active-duty dependents pay only $9.30 a day or $25 per
hospital stay, whichever is more. Retirees (under the age
of 65) do pay substantially higher out-of-pocket costs for
inpatient care financed by CHAMPUS. (Executive Summary, p.
18-13)
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Active-duty dependents face a limit of $1,000 on total
out-of-pocket costs on CHAMPUS-covered medical bills in any
fiscal year, while retirees face a limit of $7,500. Even
with these high limits, the incentives to use medical
resources efficiently are weakened for many beneficiaries by
supplemental or "wraparound" insurance policies that pay
part or all of the individual's out-of-pocket costs (U.S.
CBO, May 1993, p. 12).
The following tables summarizes beneficiaries benefits
and cost sharing in the MHSS.
BENEFICIARIES MEDICAL BENEFITS IN THE MHSS
TABLE IV




Active-duty Yes No No
service
members
Active-duty Yes, on a Yes, but may Yes
families space need non-
available availability
basis statement
Retirees, Yes, on a Yes, unless Yes, unless
their space entitled to entitled to
families and available Medicare Medicare
survivors basis (Part A) (Part A)
(Champus, 1990, p. 13).
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BENEFICIARIES COST SHARE IN THE MHSS
TABLE V
Patients Service Service Standard Standard
HOSDital Hospital CHAMPUS CHAMPUS
Inpatient Outpatient Out-
Inpatient patient
Active- $4.7510 no charge N/A N/A
duty
Active- $9.30 no charge The 20% of
duty greater of allowable
families $9.30 per charges
day or $25 after de-
per day ductible1 1
Retirees $4.7512 no charge 25% of 25% of
billed allowable
charges or charges





Retirees $9.30 no charge 25% of 25% of
families billed allowable
charges or charges




(CHAMPUS, 1990, p. 14).
1
°Costs change over time.
"
1The annual deductible for individuals is currently $150, and
for families, $300.
1 2 Ret~ired enlistees pay no charge for inpatient care at
military hospitals.




To fulfill its medical mission, DoD runs one of
the largest health care systems in the nation. In fiscal
year 1993, about 8.5 million people were eligible to receive
health care through the system (U. S. CBO, May 1993, p. 1).
This number includes men and women on active duty in the
active forces and reserves, their spouses and children, and
retired military personnel and their dependents and
survivors (U.S. CBO, May 1993, p.1). In the same fiscal
year, approximately 5.8 million beneficiaries were CHAMPUS
eligible (OCHAMPUS, undated).
Beneficiaries who choose to use the military's
health care system receive most of their care through the
direct care portion of the system. In fiscal year 1993
there were approximately 786 thousand admissions and 47
million visits at the MTF compared with 289 thousand
admissions and 14 million visits covered by CHAMPUS (Kearns,
1993).
2. DoD Health Care Expenditures
Expenditures on DoD health care activities
constitute approximately 5.6 percent of the DoD budget and
will exceed $15 billion in fiscal year 1993 (Boone, 1993,
pp. 122). Approximately $9.5 billion are directly related
to peacetime medical care for beneficiaries (U.S. CBO, May
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1993, p. 6). Of this $9.5 billion, CHAMPUS represented
approximately $3.6 billion (OCHAMPUS, undated).
3. Inflation
Increased demand for improved health care and
insufficient funds to cover sharply rising health costs have
made health care a critical economic, social, and political
issue in both the civilian sector and the MHSS. Health care
costs in both the civilian sector and the MHSS have been
rising faster than normal inflation. Inflation in the U.S.
health care sector, as measured by the medical care
component of the consumer price index (CPI), has risen 7.9
percent a year from 1982 to 1991, almost twice the rate of
growth in the overall CPI during that period (4.1 percent)
(U.S. CBO, May 1993, pp. 10, 11).
In the DoD sector alone, health care expenditures
are expected to rise at a greater percentage than the
national defense budget. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) projects that spending on peacetime medical services
to beneficiaries is likely to increase to $12 billion
between 1992 and 1997, a five-year jump of 17 percent (U.S.
CBO, 1992, p.1). This increase in health care costs
incorporates an expected 6 percent reduction in
beneficiaries by the year 1997 (U.S. CBO, 1992, p. 5). Over
the same period, the total budget for national defense would
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increase by only 2.4 percent, to about $291 billion (U.S.
CBO, 1992, p.1).
Over the past decade, CHAMPUS has experienced
rapidly escalating costs. The cost of all non-CHAMPUS
military health care has risen by roughly 145 percent since
1979, compared with a 365 percent increase for CHAMPUS over
the same time period (U.S. CBO, 1988, p.1). Thus, health
care expenditures in the civilian sector are rising faster
than in the DoD sector.
4. Heavy Health Care Usage
Compared with the U.S. population at large,
dependents of active-duty personnel use hospitals heavily
(U.S. CBO, May 1993, p. 13). In 1990, civilians in the
United States under the age of 65 consumed about 535 days of
hospital care per 1,000 people. Even after adjusting for
differences in age and sex, active-duty dependents under the
age of 65 living in the United States consumed about 720
days of care, either within the direct care system or
CHAMPUS. Thus, hospital use by active-duty dependents is
over one-third higher then the civilian rate. (U.S. CBO,
May 1993, p. 13)
5. Current Budget Process
A significant factor that is contributing to the
MHSS's heavy use is its current budget process. Military
health providers currently have few incentives to curb
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unnecessary and inappropriate health care use. DoD has
historically provided each military hospital commander with
a budget based on the quantity of care delivered and the
level of resources used at the military treatment facility
(U.S. CBO, May 1993, p. 13). To increase the facility's
budget, the MTF commander has to deliver more care and use
more resources (U.S. CBO, May 1993, pp. 13, 14). Any
inefficiencies built into health care delivery escalate from
year to year.
Under the current budget process, commanding
officers are also not rewarded for any operational
efficiencies, nor can they exercise any control over
resources. Money that is not obligated at the end of the
fiscal year is rescinded. It is assumed that the funds were
not needed. Thus, the commander is "punished" in the
following fiscal years by decreased budgets.
B. INCENTIVES FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER
With the declining defense budget, resource constraints
and cost containment become more critical each day. The
capitation model that is discussed in this research will
provide CO's with the incentive to provide cost effective
care without impeding access or quality. Individual medical
commanders would have good reason to curtail the heavy usage
under this model because their budgets would not depend on
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patient workload (U.S. CBO, 1988, p. 11). This would
necessitate the commanders to accept the full risk of
providing all of the needed health care to eligible
beneficiaries.
1. Current Budgetary System
Under the traditional budgetary system, CO's do
not have the incentive to ensure that care is provided
economically. The incentives for the CO parallel the
incentives for fee-for-service in the civilian sector;
greater workload leads to greater income. Similarly,
standard CHAMPUS care is paid on a fee-for-service basis.
As scarce resources dwindle, the current budgetary
system ensures that CO's receive their "fair" share by
demonstrating a "need" for funds. Unfortunately, this
"need" is validated by the number of services provided. As
more services are performed, regardless of the need, the
requirement for the limited funds is substantiated.
The current budgetary system also pressures the
local commanding officers to bring in-house as much of the
highly visible CHAMPUS workload as possible. This is based
on the premise that the facility and the capacity exists and
its utility should be maximized whether or not other more
cost effective alternatives exist. Furthermore, bringing
more work in-house strengthens the justification for larger
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operating budgets and demonstrates the indispensable nature
of the operation.
2. Capitation
A capitated budget helps ensure that commanding
officers use limited resources economically. If COs receive
presumably all of their funds based upon the number of
beneficiaries in their catchment area, the incentive to
perform unnecessary care is eliminated. CO's no longer have
to "game" the system by providing more services to receive
their share of the medical budget. Commanding Officers, as
local managers, would also have the flexibility and the
incentives to make trade-offs between delivering care in-
house or through CHAMPUS.
However, a commander who receives a capitated
budget will have incentives similar to the civilian sector,
and focus on revenue generating workload (i.e. Third Party
Collections), and draw resources away from the capitated
beneficiary. The establishment of utilization reviews will
ensure that the capitated beneficiaries access to needed
health care services is not affected.
a. Gatekeepers
True capitation budgeting will give the
commanders the incentive to coordinate and control the
beneficiary's health care needs. This would be accomplished
in part by the establishing a gatekeepex to control access
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to high cost specialists. The function of the designated
primary care physician (gatekeeper) would serve as the
beneficiary's sole entry point into the health care system
(aside from emergencies). The gatekeeper would be
responsible for referrals to specialists. Using a
gatekeeper would help eliminate the inefficient use of high
cost specialists by designating a health care manager.
Beneficiaries would no longer be able to dictate their
specialty care use.
b. Flexibility
As opposed to the current system, under a
capitated budget, the commanding officers will also have the
flexibility to make trade offs regarding the allocation of
their resources. For example, CO's will have the
flexibility to use any "excess" money to enhance mission
requirement (i.e. purchasing equipment, upgrading
facilities, or hiring civilian employees).
C. MILITARY PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES
Active duty physicians within the military health care
services system are salaried and have no financial incentive
to "churn," or perform unnecessary procedures for additional
financial remuneration. Military physicians are paid the
same regardless of the care rendered. The incentives for
active duty physicians are analogous to the incentives for
salaried physicians in the civilian sector. However, due to
62
ii
shortcomings in the current military health care system,
active duty physicians do contribute to the heavy medical
use, particularly high-cost hospital care (U.S. CBO, 1988).
1. Traditional Budgetary System
Under the traditional budgetary system, military
physicians are rewarded for generating additional workload.
Although their salary is not contingent upon the amount of
services they perform, their fitness reports and promotions
may be. As Naval Officers, physicians' promotions are
largely based upon their fitness reports. Fitness reports
are completed by the CO. Many physicians are presently
receiving "A" fitness reports and high ratings, indicating
they are delivering high quality care. These ratings don't
reflect that the care may not be provided prudently. One
explanation for this behavior is that commanders are
"rewarded" by increased budgets when physicians prescribe
care uneconomically. At least their budgets have escaped
being "cut" due to limited resources.
Apart from the current reward system, there are
other reasons that physicians may use health care resource
imprudently. MHSS physicians, similar to salaried
physicians in the civilian sector, have no incentive to
increase their productivity or limit their use of high cost
technology because their income is not contingent upon
productivity. Physicians may also want to satisfy the
63
patient by providing care that is demanded, verses what is
actually needed.
2. Incentives Under Capitation
Personally, physicians are rewarded with
competitive fitness reports and promotions for delivering
health care that is consistent with the commander's goals.
Under capitation budgeting, the commanding officer doesn't
have an incentive to generate additional workload to receive
a larger operational budget. The incentive is to optimize
the utility of limited available resources to provide
quality care. If the capitated budget exceeds the cost of
delivering health care, the CO can use the excess to help
fulfill mission requirement and the delivery of quality
medical care. Thus, military physicians in the MHSS have an
incentives under capitation budgeting to provide care
economically and efficiently.
a. Physicians as Gatekeepers
As mentioned in the previous section, the
physicians have the ultimate responsibility for delivering
quality care. They directly determine the amount of
resources expended for each unit of patient care, and the
trade off between the demand, need, and patient utilization.
Since capitation provides incentives to economize, military
health care providers have an incentive to modify their
medical practices. As gatekeepers, primary care physicians
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can use hospital resources efficiently by regulating
specialist consultations and other expensive services.
Under capitation, the beneficiaries sole access to
specialists, other than medical emergencies, is a referral
from their primary care physician.
b. Command Influence
Commanding officers of medical treatment
facilities also create an incentive for active duty
physicians to provide health care efficiently. If the
commander feels that the physician's ordering habits are
excessive, the commander has the prerogative to take
disciplinary action against the physician. Under true
capitation budgeting, the commander can also transfer the
active duty physician to another command, essentially
"firing" the physician.
D. MHSS BENEFICIARY INCENTIVES
Capitation budgeting in itself will not encourage MHSS
beneficiaries to economize on health care. However, the
civilian sector's HMOs reduced hospital admissions without
affecting the quality of care. This suggests that heavy use
in the Military Health Services System does not necessarily
promote better health. It appears that military health care
services can be reduced without harming health.
There are two interrelated ways to reduce the
beneficiaries' demand for MHSS: create incentives for the
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beneficiaries to be cost conscious; and rely on gatekeepers
to manage the patients' health care requirements.
1. Incentives With Current System
Beneficiaries of the MHSS currently have no
incentives to use care economically. All of their health
care needs, or wants, are provided virtually free. The
patient who pays nothing for care will want to use medical
services as long as they yield any benefit, regardless of
the cost to society (Aaron, 1992, pp. 24-28). Beneficiaries
do not face the economic consequences of their decisions.
Patients do not face a budget constraint when consuming
health care, as they do in purchasing other goods (Aaron,
1992, pp. 24-28). In the absence of such incentives,
limited access serves to ration available care. In effect,
the MTF relies on capacity constraints to reign beneficiary
demand. The central issue in cost control is how to create
the "economic man" concept on part of the beneficiaries.
2. Managed Competition
A principal feature of managed health care is
creating incentives to foster cost-consciousness among
consumers in their health care decisions (U.S. CBO, Feb
1993). As mentioned in the previous section, cost-
consciousness is associated with patient cost sharing
arrangements. Various studies have proven that cost-sharing
encourages consumers to make more efficient decisions
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regarding their health care needs. This has a positive
effect on health care utilization rates (Executive Summary,
pp.1811.1)
Under a capitation-based budgetary system, cost
consciousness must be established among the beneficiaries to
reduce the demand for health care. Civilian sector
capitated and managed health care systems include some cost
sharing by the consumers. To achieve similar results,
beneficiary cost sharing should be introduced in conjunction
with captation budgeting in the MHSS. This would serve as
the principal mechanism to control beneficiary demand for
health care.
a. Past Experience
In the past, DoD has focused on controlling
costs by improving incentives to providers. It has
neglected strategies to increase the cost-consciousness of
beneficiaries (U.S. CBO, May 1993, p. 15). Low CHAMPUS cost
sharing and "free" health care at MTF's exacerbates the
problem of unrestrained beneficiary demand for health care.
b. Cost Sharing
One way to introduce beneficiary cost sharing
into the MHSS is by establishing a "nuisance fee." A
nuisance fee is a small charge every time a beneficiary is
seen at the emergency room or as an outpatient. This would
keep the "worried well" out of the MHSS system, saving
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valuable health care dollars. The nuisance fee would
stimulate "economic man" behavior on the part of the
beneficiary. 1 4 Beneficiaries will face economic
consequences from their decisions to seek health care at the
MHSS.
Introducing any beneficiary cost sharing in
the MHSS will be politically difficult. Beneficiary groups
have historically viewed increases in cost-sharing
requirements as a reduction in their benefits (U.S. CBO, May
1993, pp. 25, 26). This could ultimately affect retention
rates in the military services.
3. Gatekeeper
As mentioned previously, the beneficiary's health
care needs will be directed by a gatekeeper. The gatekeeper
will guide the patient toward the most appropriate care, and
determine when high cost specialty care is required.
Patients will no longer have unlimited choice of health care
providers, nor receive specialty care without a referral
from their primary physician. This restricts beneficiaries
behavior to a more cost effective range of care options and,
therefore, reduces health care expenditures principally for
high cost procedures.
14There is evidence that a "small charge" achieves its
intended purpose in a study conducted by Joel Slackman in a March
1984 CBO study, Options for Change in Military Medical Care.
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a. Patient Satisfaction
It should be noted that establishing a
gatekeeper might affect patient satisfaction. Satisfaction
represents the degree to which a patient perceives that
his/her expectations of health care have been fulfilled
(Executive Summary). If patients feel that their condition
warrants a specialist, and the gatekeeper feels differently,
the patients' demand (expectation) has not been meet.
Patient satisfaction will most likely be affected when the
patients' perceived demand does not equal the patients' real
health care needs.
Under the traditional budgetary system,
patient satisfaction would not be an issue. The patients'
demands are satisfied (to the extent that limited access and
capacity permits) because the MHSS budget is based on the
various medical departments' workload. The more workload
generated, the larger the health care budget. There are no
incentives for the health care provider to equate the
demand, need, and the cost of health care.
E. QUALITY OF CARE
The same quality concerns for a capitation-based
resources allocation system in the civilian sector are
issues in the MHSS. These concerns arise because health




To ensure that quality of care is retained under
capitation, the MHSS would need to conduct utilization
reviews similar to those conducted in the civilian sector.
These reviews would include a preadmission review,
concurrent review, and retrospective review. This would
help ensure that the appropriate health care is being
delivered and quality care is not jeopardized.
Studies have shown that despite the added overhead
costs of utilization reviews, managed care organizations
that conduct these reviews still demonstrate cost savings.
A 1988 12-year Rand Corporation study found that HMO members
save up to 28 percent on health care costs, compared to
individuals in the traditional fee-for-service system
(Should.ce, 1991, pp. 32, 33).
2. Military Uniqueness
Unlike the civilian sector, the MHSS also has
additional incentives to deliver high quality care and
ensure its beneficiaries remain healthy.
First, the 1.9 million active duty members of the
armed forces must be physically fit and prepared to deploy
at all times. DoD would not want to jeopardize the security
of the United States because the service members' health
care had eroded due to financial limitations. Thus, the
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military readiness component gives commanders an incentive
to deliver quality care.
Second, the Military Health Services System is
responsible for and provides beneficiaries with health care
as long as they are eligible for care. They cannot be
"dropped" from the MHSS because they are high risk, or heavy
users of the system. Therefore, there is an incentive to
keep the beneficiary healthy and maintain high quality of
care. If quality is reduced, the beneficiary will
potentially consume more health care resources in the long
run, an avoidable added expense.
Finally, health care is a major benefit to entice
individuals to join the military. If quality of health care
is sacrificed, retention rates could be adversely affected.
Thus, there is a built in incentive for the commanding
officer and DoD to ensure that quality is sustained.
F. SUMMARY
Implementing a capitation-based resource allocation in
the Military Health Services System will change the
incentives for the various players in the health care arena.
Since capitation is a relatively new concept to the MHSS,
prepaid care among private managed care programs, including
HMOs, can offer some important lessons. This chapter
addressed the incentives to the various players concerning
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efficiency and quality of health care. It drew heavily on
the private sector's experience.
The following chapter will draw conclusions and make
recommendations as to whether a capitation-based resource
allocation system will provide the incentives necessary to
provide quality, cost-effective care within the Military
Medical Department. The result will be based on the
findings of the four subsidiary research questions.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This research was designed to determine if a
capitation-based resource allocation system will provide the
incentives necessary to provide quality, cost-effective care
within the Military Health Services System . To answer this
question, four subsidiary research questions were addressed:
(1) What incentives exist for the local commanding
officer under a capitation-based resource
allocation system.
(2) Does a capitation-based resource allocation system
provide active duty physicians with the incentives
to provide cost-effective care.
(3) What are the incentives for the beneficiaries of
the Military Health Services System under a
capitation budgeting.
(4) Will the quality of care erode under a capitation-
based resource allocation system in the Military
Health Services System.
To answer these questions, capitation budgeting and its
salient characteristics were defined. Then, the risks and
incentives associated with capitation budgeting were
compared against other budgetary methods. Subsequently, the
civilian sector's experience with prepaid managed care plans
was analyzed. This analysis focused on the incentives to
the various health care players under a pre-paid, managed
care plan. It also questioned whether the quality of care
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has been effected. Next, the study drew on civilian sector
experience to evaluate the potential impact of incentives on
various players in the Military Health Services System. The
analysis was limited to the private sector's capitation
methodology because DoD capitation policies are still
evolving.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this analysis lead to the conclusion
that a capitation-based resource allocation system will
provide the proper incentives for the various players in the
military health care arena to provide quality, cost-
effective care.
This finding assumes that a form of a full-risk
staff/group model HMO will exist in the MHSS and gatekeepers
will be employed. It also assumes that an enrollment system
will exist before a true capitation-based resource
allocation system is implemented. Finally, the "economic
.•an" concept must be introduced to the beneficiaries of the
military health care system by establishing a "nuisance
fee." This includes addressing the issues concerning the
supplemental or "wraparound" insurance policies available to
beneficiaries that limit or negate their out-of-pocket
cosLt. MTF commanding officers must also have local




Based on the findings and conclusions presented above,
it appears that the Military Health Services System should
employ a capitation-based resc-.-ce allocation system.
However, before implementing capitation budgeting in the
MHSS, matters such as enrollment, beneficiary cost-sharing,
gatekeepers and the ability of local CO's to make trade-off
decisions regarding their resources, must be resolved. This
would help emulate the civilian sector's success in
providing quality, cost-effective care under prepaid,
managed care plans.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The focus of this analysis was to determine if a
capitation-based resource allocation system within the MHSS
would create the necessary incentives to provide quality,
cost-effective care. Due to the limitations of this study,
there are areas of captation budgeting that warrant further
research. They are the following:
(1) Evaluate the per capita cost of health care under
capitation budgeting in the MHSS.
(2) After establishing a capitated model in the
military health care services system, evaluate its
effectiveness.
(3) Evaluate the incentives for the commanding officer
of the MTF to transfer beneficiaries to other
medical facilities.
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(4) Address the need for the implementation of
information systems to collect the necessary data
required under a capitation-based resource
allocation system.
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APPENDIX A - DOD CAPITATION BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL
FY 94 CAPITATION METHODOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS1 5
Working groups composed of OASD(HA) personnel in
concert with the Military Departments developed the initial,
financial-based modified capitation methodology for use in
determining the FY 94 Defense Health Program (DHP) resource
allocation to the three Military Departments. This
methodology has been further adapted to incorporate some of
the concepts of managed care. The central idea of managed
care is that it is a strategy that uses capitation as one of
its approaches to containing costs while assuring
accessibility and high quality of health care services.
The model is population driven and accounts for
military unique and medical readiness related functions.
This model has three major categories: (1) "Military
Medical Support," consisting on non-capitated functions not
directly related to the size of the force structure. (2)
"Military.Medical Unique Capitation Rate," an additive to
the basic capitation rate for military personnel. This
category reflects the military, medical unique costs and a
portion of medical readiness costs that are related to the
size of the force structure and is derived from specific
requirements of the Military Departments. The first and
second categories contain Military Personnel (MILPERS) and
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Direct Care funds. Medical
Readiness will be protected. Transfer of resources out of
Medial Support (Category 1) or Military Medical Unique
Capitated (Category 2) programs must be approved by the
OASD(HA). (3) "Medical Capitated Cost Rate," analogous to
the capitation rate used in civilian Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO) or Health Alliances. This rate would be
similar. to medical rates charge by competing health plans
under managed care. Included in this category are all costs
(MILPERS, O&M Direct Care and O&M CHAMPUS) associated with
providing patient care other than specific unique
requirements for active duty members which are included in
1 5Source: United States Department of Defense, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Preparing the
Military Health Services System (MHSS) for Capitation-based
Resource Allocation. (attachment 1), Washington, D.C., 23 July,
1993.
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the second category. If during the budget or execution
year, the Military Departments reduce the medical Military
Personnel funding below the level approved in the DHP POM
and transferred to the Military Departments for budget
formulation and execution the DHP can use this as a basis
for a budget adjustment or an execution year reprogramming
action to correct this imbalance.
The following three sections contain examples and the
methodology for the calculation of items used in the
computation of the proposed model, to include the
identification of executable items for FY94 and a projection
of some items to be included in FY95. These lists are not
all inclusive and will be more fully developed when
information is received from the Military Departments at
upcoming work group sessions.
(1) Military Medical Support
A. (FY94 Executable Examples)
Medical Entrance Processing
Overseas Activities, (excludes 50 states)
Aeromedical Evacuation System
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
Environmental Restoration
Capital Expense Initial Outfitting
B. (FY95 Executable Examples)
Referrals from Overseas
Contingency Bed Capacity
Others to be Determined
Military Medical Support funding will be determined by
considering mission changed, realignments, BRAC, inflation
and other adjustments normally considered in the budgeting
process.
(2) Military Medical Unique Capitation Rate
Readiness Planning
Physiological Training Flights and Labs
Military Funded Emergency Leave
Readiness Exercises and Training
Veterinary Services
Optical Labs
Education and Training (cost projections will be
capitated on medical active duty population)
Dental Care
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These items are provided as examples that would be
included in the FY94. These are functions and activities
that have a relationship to the size of the military
population supported.
Calculation of the Rate: The FY92 costs for these
functions will be identified by the Military Departments and
adjusted to ensure the overseas portion is addressed in the
first category, "Military Medical Support." This amount
will be divided by the responsible Military Department FY92
active duty population yielding a Service-specific,
"Military Medical Unique Capitation Rate." This rate will
be inflated to FY94.
(3) Medical Capitated Cost
Calculation of the Rate: The base year of FY92 will be
adjusted to reflect existing funding anomalies such as Army
RPMA/Base Operating Support (BOS) costs, items funded from
other than Medical Force Program 8 sources, etc. The
amounts expended in the FY92 for (1)"Military Medical
Support" and (2) "Military Medical Unique Capitation Rate"
will be subtracted from the total obligations to yield the
(3) "Medical Capitated Cost" amount. This amount will be
divided by the Military Department estimated user
beneficiary population to yield a Military Department
specific capitation rate. This rate will be inflated to
FY94 with corrections based upon FY93 execution data. As
the model progresses and more costs are identified in the
first two categories, the need for this information will be
eliminated.
(4) User Population
Calculation: All Medical Health Services System
eligible beneficiaries do not use the system. For the
purposes of computing capitation rates the number of
estimated users of the system, based on full-time
equivalents, will be used as the basis rather than the
number of eligible. Because we do not have an enrollment
system, the number of users will be estimated by comparing
our observed workload with civilian experience. Estimates
of the number of users for the base-year will be developed
by responsible Military Department and beneficiary category.
In future years, until an enrollment system is in place, the
number of users will be measured by means of a survey. For
the outyears, population projection of all eligible enrolled
beneficiaries, as provided by the Military Departments, will




Calculation: The (1) "Military Medical Support" costs
will be inflated and adjusted to FY94. The (2) "Military
Medical Unique Capitation" rate will be applied to the
budgeted end strength and medical end strength for each
Service. These two amounts will be subtracted from
available funding, and the residual will be allocated to the
Military Departments based upon estimated users. Any
shortfall in funding will be appropriately apportioned among
the Military Departments.
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APPENDIX B - DEFINITIONS
Adjusted average per capita coSts (AAPCC). Medicare's
managed care payment system. Payment is set at 95 percent
of the amount estimated by the Health Care Financing
Administration that similar care would have cost in a fee-
for-service setting. (Shouldice, 1991, p. 505)
Alternative delivery and financing system. An alternative
to the fee-for-service financing system. Examples include a
health maintenance organization (HMO), independent physician
association (IPA), or preferred provider organization (PPO)
(Slee, 1986, p.8).
American Medical Association (AMA). A national association
of physicians (Slee, 1986, p. 9).
Case mix. The mix of cases, defined by age, sex, diagnosis,
treatments, severity of illness, and so on, handled by a
practitioner or hospital. Case mix is defined by: (1)
grouping patients according to these factors; and then (2)
determining the proportion of the total falling into each
group. (Slee, 1986, p. 20)
Catchment Area. Defined geographic area served by a
hospital, clinic, or dental clinic and delineated on the
basis of such factors as population distribution, natural
geographic boundaries, and transportation accessibility.
For the Department of Defense Components, those geographic
areas are determined by a set of 5-digit zip codes, usually
within an approximate 40-mile radius of military inpatient
treatmenit facilities. (Glossary, BUMED Inst. 6320.69)
Churn. Perform unnecessary medical procedures for
additional renumeration. Typically an issue under a fee-
for-service system. (Aiken, 1989)
Competitive Medical Plan (CMP). Any organization that meets
specific eligibility criteria for Medicare risk contracting
but is not necessarily an HMO. CMPs must be "at-risk" and
provide physicians' services primarily through employees of
the organization or through contracts with individual
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physicians or groups of physicians. The CMP enters into an
agreement with HCFA to provide specific services to Medicare
beneficiaries for a predetermined and prepaid capitation sum
based on HCFA's AAPCC. (Slee, 1986, p. 29)
Copayment. The share of the charges for a service for which
the beneficiary is responsible under a coinsurance plan
(Slee, 1986, p. 31).
Cost containment. Containing the costs of health care as a
whole without impairing quality (Ginzberg, 1990, p. 270).
Cost Shifting. Increasing the charges to one group of
patients (who presumably have the ability to pay, such as
private pay patients) when the payment for another group of
patients will not cover the costs (Slee, 1986, p. 33).
Deductibles. Amounts required to be paid by the insured
under a health insurance contract before benefits become
payable. Intended as a deterrent to overuse. (Shouldice,
1991, p. 508)
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). A hospital patient
classification system. The current payment system for
Medicare is based on the federal government's setting a
predetermined price for the "package of care" in the
hospital (exclusive of the physician's fees) for each DRG.
If the hospital can provide the care for less than the
price, it can keep the "profit". If the care costs the
hospital more than the price, the hospital has to absorb the
loss. (Slee, 1986, p. 43)
Direct care system. The direct health care system is made
up of hospitals and clinics operated by the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. It includes 140 hospitals and 553 clinics
worldwide and employs more than 54,000 civilian, as well as
146,000 active-duty military personnel. Almost all of the
care that beneficiaries receive through the direct care
system is supplied by military physicians working at the
Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs). (U.S. CBO, 1993, p. 3)
Enrollee. Any person eligible for services, either as a
subscriber or a dependent, in accordance with a contract.
In this study, subscriber/patient/enrollee are used
interchangeably. (Shouldice, 1991, p. 509)
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Fee for service. In respect to the physician or other
supplier of service, this refers to the payment of specific
amounts for specific services rendered on a service unit
basis - as opposed to salary, or other contract
arrangements. In relation to the patient, it refers to the
payment of specific amounts for specific services received
on a service unit basis, as opposed to the advance payment
of an insurance premium or membership fee for coverage under
a plan that provides the services or payment to the
supplier. (Shouldice, 1991, p. 510)
Full risk. Full risk includes both the risk on providing
health care independent of the financing mechanisms and the
financial risk.
Gatekeeper. A patient care manager who comes between the
patient and secondary (specialist) care. This is one role
of a primary care physician. (Slee, 1986, p. 55)
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). The division
of the Department of Health and Human Services which
administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs at the
federal level (Slee, 1986, p. 58).
Health Service Organization (HSO). Usually a regional
medical center, hospital, or medical group practice that
delivers medical services. A generic term that describes
organizations that deliver medical or mental health
services. (Shouldice, 1991, p. 511)
Incentive. Refers to the economic incentives for hospitals
by means of third party reimbursement formulas to motivate
efficiency in management; or economic incentives for
physicians who encourage decreased hospital utilization,
promote judicious use of all resources, and increase
delivery of preventive health services (shouldice, 1991, p.
512).
Indemnity Insurance. Insurance benefits provided in cash to
the beneficiary rather than in services (service benefits).
Indemnity insurance companies (e.g. Cigna, Metropolitan,
Aetna) provide a wide range of health insurance benefits for
which the employer bears no risk beyond the premium payments
made on behalf of its employees. (Slee, 1986, p. 67)
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Moral stress test. When a physician, in order to serve the
needs of their patients, are forced to act in ways that are
contrary to their own interests. In a system of restrictive
gatekeeping, physicians are forced continually into a series
of moral stress tests, knowing that the consequences of
doing good for a patient will either entail financial
penalties for themselves or limit the resources available to
other patients. (Sulmdsy, 1992, pp. 922-924)
Over-utilization. To provide more health care services then
is necessary.
Panel. In regards to preferred provider organizations, it
is a list of designated health care providers that contract
to provide health care services, usually at a discount, to a
defined population (Shouldice, 1991, pp. 57-60).
Patient. A person who has established a contractual
relationship with a health care provider for that provider
to care for that person. In this study,
subscriber/patient/enrollee are used interchangeably.
(Slee, 1986, p. 102)
Per Diem Payment. Reimbursement of an institution, usually
a hospital, based on a set rate per day rather than on
charges. Per diem reimbursement can be varied by service
(e.g.. med/surg, OB, mental health, ICU, etc.) or be uniform
regardless of intensity of services. (Slee, 1986, p. 105)
Physicians. A person qualified by a doctor's degree in
medicine (Slee, 1986, p. 107).
Premium. A prospectively determined rate that e member pays
for specific health services (Shouldice, 1991, p. 515).
Prospective payment system. A term which actually means
prospective "pricing" system. The generic term for the
system currently in use for paying for services for Medicare
patients under the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) program.
The idea is that patients are classified into categories for
which prices are negotiated or imposed on the hospital in
advance. (Slee, 1986, p. 115)
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Provider. A hospital or health care professional who
provides health care services to patients. May be a single
hospital, an individual, or a group or organization. (Slee,
1986, p. 116)
Restrictive gatekeeper. Any system in which either the
physicians' income or the money available to the physician
to provide care for other patients is tied to the
physician's proficiency in limiting tests, treatments, and
consultations ordered for patients. This method is often
used for example in a for profit health maintenance
organization. It can take several forms, for example
financial penalties for the use of resources at a level
deemed to be excessive, financial rewards (such as bonuses)
for the use of resources at a level deemed to be efficient,
or capitation systems in which a fixed amount of money is
allotted to the physician to use in caring for a fixed
number of patients over a determined period. (Sulmasy,
1992, p. 925)
Risk. Any chance, or the possibility that revenues of the
health plan will not be sufficient to cover expenditures
incurred in the delivery of health care (Shouldice, 1991, p.
516).
Risk sharing. Physicians and hospitals have agreed to a
financial stake in the health plan's operation; their
compensation is based, to some degree, on fheir ability to
hold the use of services a' an appropriate level and to
decrease the use of the mcit expensive sources of care.
(Shouldice, 1991, p. 516)
Salary.. Salary systems are taken to include all systems in
which the physician's income is determined by time (for
example, annually or hourly). In salary systems, neither the
physicians income nor the budget available to care for the
patient depends upon proficiency in limiting per capita
patient care expenditures. (Sulmasy, 1992, p. 925)
Subscriber. A person enrolled in a prepayment plan. In
this study, subscriber/patient/enrollee are used
interchangeably. (Slee, 1986. p. 140)
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA).
Authorized Medicare to pay, on a prospective rate-setting
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basis, those organizations that have a cost-based or risk-
based contract with the HCFA (Shouldice, 1991, p. 49).
Utilization Review. Incorporates three separate components
designed to facilitate appropriate cost-efficient care.
1. Preadxmission review is intended to justify the
medical need for an acute inpatient admission.
The primary focus is to determine whether or not
the patient needs inpatient care based on the
perceived severity of the patients illness and the
required length of service.
2. Concurrent review monitors the patient's hospital
stay in regard to necessity of continued hospital
care. The priority is to emphasize efficiency and
expediency of care, treating the patient at the
most appropriate level of acuity.
3. Retrospective review analyzes utilization data by
case, by service, or by physician, in an attempt
to uncover any trends or variances that may
require more specific attention. (Rosenstein,
1991, p. 318)
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APPENDIX C - MANAGED HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Types of Managed Health Care Organizations 1 6
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION (HMO)
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are organized
health care systems that are responsible for the financing
and delivering a broad range of comprehensive health
services to an enrolled population for a prepaid, fixed fee.
An HMO can be viewed as a combination of a health insurer
and a health care delivery system. Whereas traditional
health care insurance companies are responsible for
reimbursing covered individuals for the cost of their health
care, HMOs are responsible for providing health care
services to their covered members through affiliated
providers.
As a result of their responsibility for providing
covered health services to their members, HMOs must assure
that their members have access to covered health care
services. In addition, HMOs are generally responsible for
assuring the quality and appropriateness of health services
they provide.
The five common models of HMOs are staff, group
practice, network, individual practice association (IPA),
and direct contract. The primary differences between each
of these models are based on how the HMO relates to its
participating physicians.
Staff Model
In a staff model HMO, the physicians who serve the
HMO's beneficiaries are employed by the HMO. These
physicians typically are paid on a salary basis and may also
receive bonus or incentive payments based on their
performance and productivity. Staff model HMOs must employ
physicians in all of the common specialties in order to
provide for their members' health care needs. These HMOs
may contract with selected subspecialists in the community
for infrequently needed health services.
Staff model HMOs are also known as "closed panel" HMOs
because most participating physicians are employees of the
HMO. Community physicians are unable to participate. Staff
1 6Source: Kongstvedt, Peter R., ed., The Managed Health Care
Handbook, (Rockville: Aspen Publishers, Inc, 1989), 11-18.
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model HMOs usually contract with hospitals and other
inpatient facilities in the community to provide
nonphysician services for their members.
Staff model HMOs can have an advantage relative to
other HMO models because they have greater control over the
practice patterns of their physicians. As a result, it can
be easier for staff model HMOs to manage and control health
services.
Group Model
In group model HMOs, the HMO contracts with a multi-
specialty physician group practice to provide all physician
services to the HMO's members. The physicians in the group
practice are employed by the group practice and not by the
HMO. In some cases, these physicians may be allowed to see
both HMO patients and other patients, although their primary
function may be to treat HMO members.
Physicians in group practices share facilities,
equipment, medical records, and support staff. The group
may contract with the HMO on an all-inclusive capitation
basis to provide physician services to HMO members.
Alternatively, the group may contract on a cost basis to
provide its services.
Network Model
In network model HMOs, t"- HMO contracts with more than
one group practice to provide physician services to the
HMO's members. These group practices may be broad-based,
multi-specialty groups, in which case the HMO resembles the
group model described above. Alternatively, the HMO may
contract with several small groups of primary care
physicians in which case the HMO can be classified as a
primary care network model.
In contrast to Staff and group model HMOs, network
models may be either closed or open panel plans. If the
network model HMO is a closed panel plan, it will only
contract with a limited number of existing group practices.
If it is an open panel plan, participation in the group
practices will be open to any physician who meets the HMO's
and group's credentials criteria.
IPA Model
IPA model HMOs contract with an association of
physicians - the independent practice association (IPA) - to
provide physician services to their members. The physicians
are members of the IPA, which is a separate legal entity,
but they remain individual practitioners and retain their
separate offices and identities. IPA physicians continue to
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see their non-HMO patients and maintain their own offices,
medical records, and support staff. IPA model HMOs are open
panel plans because participation is open to all community
physicians who meet the HMO's and IPA's credentials
criteria.
Direct Contract Model
As the name implies, direct contract model HMOs
contract directly with individual physicians to provide
physician services to their members. With the exception of
their direct contractual relationship with participating
physicians, direct contract model HMOs are similar to IPA
model plans.
Direct contract model HMOs attempt to recruit broad
panels of community physicians to provide physician services
as participating providers. These HMOs usually recruit both
primary care and specialist physicians and typically use a
primary care case management approach (also known as the
"gatekeeper" system).
Like IPA model plans, direct contract model HMOs
compensate their physicians on either a fee-for-service
basis or primary care capitation basis. Primary care
capitation is much more commonly used by direct contract
model HMOs because it helps to limit the financial risk
assumed by the HMO. Unlike IPA model HMOs, direct contract
model HMOs retain most of the financial risk for providing
physician services; IPA model plans transfer this risk to
their IPAs.
INDEPENDENT PRACTICE ASSOCIATION (IPA)
An independent practice association (IPA), which is
also known as an individual practice association, is an
association of individual, independent physicians or small
groups of physicians that has been formed to contract with
one or more managed health care organizations. IPAs may
adopt any of several organizational forms, including not-
for-profit membership corporations, for-profit stock
corporations, partnerships, and associations.
IPAs serve several important functions for HMOs and
other managed health care organization. First, they provide
a mechanism for translating capitation payments from an HMO
into another form of physician payment. HMOs find it
desirable to make their payments to physicians and other
providers on a capitated basis. In contrast, many
physicians are reluctant to accept capitation payment for
their services. May IPAs bridge this gap by accepting
capitation payments from HMOs and converting these payments
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into fee-for-service payments to individual participating
physicians.
PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATION (PPO)
Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) are entities
through which employer health benefit plans and health
insurance carriers contract to purchase health care services
for covered beneficiaries from a select group of
participating providers. Typically, participating providers
in PPOs agree to abide by utilization management and other
procedures implemented by the PPO and agree to accept the
PPO's reimbursement structure and payment levels. In
return, PPOs often limit the size of their participating
provider panels and provide incentives for their covered
individuals to use participating providers instead of other
providers. In contrast to typical HMO coverage, individuals
with PPO coverage are permitted to use non-PPO providers,
although higher levels of coinsurance or deductibles
routinely apply to services provided by these non-
participating providers.
INDEPENDENT PRACTITIONER ORGANIZATION (IPO)
Independent practitioner organizations (IPOs) are a
hybrid form of entity that has characteristics in common
with both IPAs and medical associations. IPOs are generally
organized by community physicians to evaluate and negotiate
participation in HMOs and other managed care organizations.
Whereas the primary purpose of an IPA is to act as a vehicle
for physicians to participate in an HMO, the primary purpose
of an IPO is to service as clearing house for information
about managed health care organizations for its members
physicians.
In general, IPOs do not accept financial risk for
providing services to HMO or PPO members. Instead, IPOs
collect and review information about how the HMOs and PPOs
in their communities operate so they can advise their
members about participation.
EXCLUSIVE PROVIDER ORGANIZATION (EPO)
Exclusive provider organizations (EPOs) are similar to
PPOs in their organization and purpose. Unlike PPOs,
however, EPOs limit their beneficiaries to participating
providers for their health care services. In other words,
beneficiaries covered by an EPO are required to receive all
of their covered health care services from providers that
participate with the EPO. The EPO does not cover services
received from other providers.
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Some EPOs parallel HMOs in that they require exclusive
use of the EPO provider network and also use a "gatekeeper"
approach to authorize nonprimary care services. In these
cases, the primary difference between and HMO and an EPO is
that the former is regulated under HMO laws and regulations
while the latter is regulated under insurance laws and
regulations.
EPOs usually are implemented by employers whose primary
motivation is cost saving. These employers are less
concerned about the reaction of their employees to severe
restrictions on the choice of health care provider.
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